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Creditors, Debtors and the Law 
in Victorian and Edwardian England I 
In 1853 the granddaughter of the eminent English jurist, Sir William 
Blackstone, entered in her local County Court a plaint for damages against Thomas 
Turner, agricultural labourer and part-time town crier of Wallingford in the county of 
Berkshire. Following an earlier legal dispute between Turner's brother, William, and 
Miss Blackstone over the rent of allotment gardens, in which the case against 
Blackstone had been dismissed, Thomas Turner was alleged to have assaulted Miss 
Blackstone as she left the court. According to the plaintiff, Turner ' thrust both his 
clenched fists ' at her over the shoulder of another man, 'and struck at me three or 
four times close to my face . He did not touch me but was very close . ... He also 
made use of some very opprobrious expressions unfit for any woman to hear . He said 
"D--- your b--- eyes you have robbed and swindled me of £30".'2 
The initial reason for the resort to legal process by William Turner, and 
common to the great majority of cases pursued through the new County Courts 
established in 1846, was an alleged contractual debt. Indeed, the legislation 
establishing this County Court system, which rapidly came to dominate all other civil 
courts in terms of the volume of business conducted, was entitled ' An Act for the 
more easy Recovery of Small Debts and Demands in England.'3 However, these 
courts also had jurisdiction in actions founded on tort, up to the value of £50 , and it 
was on this basis that Miss Blackstone brought her case for damages against Thomas 
Turner. This case of Blackstone vs. Turner is of significance for reasons other than 
the juridical ancestry of the plaintiff, because it illustrates some of the biases of court 
procedure and sentencing policy in these lowly civil courts . 
I This paper was prepared for a conference on 'Private Law and Social Inequality in 
the Industrial Age' held at the German Historical Institute, London , 14-17 December 1995. 
2 Berkshire Chronicle, 16 July 1853. 
3 9 and 10 Vict. c. 95 . 
Thomas Turner 'conscientiously , strongly and fmnly ' denied that the alleged 
offence of constructive assault had been committed, though he agreed his language had 
been unguarded. Blackstone called forth her maid, her land surveyor, a butcher and 
a labourer as witnesses to the assault; Turner called a hotelier, two painters, a 
bootmaker and his daughter (who also happened to be, respectively, his brother-in-law 
and niece), all of whom attested to the fact that they had not seen Turner raise his 
fists . Judge J.B. Parry, Q.C., had no doubt about Turner' s guilt, since in his view 
' if every person in that court had been called and said they did not see the defendant 
strike the plaintiff, it could not have countervailed the evidence of unimpeached 
witnesses. ' 4 
This unequivocal verdict stood at odds with the evidence. Miss Blackstone had 
initially attempted a criminal action against Turner, and had taken out a summons for 
him to appear before the magistrates, but had been forced to abandon that course,s 
probably because of the flimsy nature of the case. One anonymous WalLingford J.P. 
noted in a letter to the County Courts Chronicle that there had been ' a great 
discrepancy of the evidence produced, and several credible witnesses swore positively 
that no assault had been committed.'6 Why Judge Parry took such a one-sided view 
of the conflicting evidence is unclear, but the social pressures for him to do so must 
have been great. Miss Blackstone' s brother, William Seymour Blackstone was the 
Deputy Lieutenant for Berkshire, had been the Conservative M.P. for Wallingford for 
the twenty years from 1832, the family had the patronage of the Anglican living at 
Wallingford / and according to Dod's Electoral Facts in 1853, ' the territorial and 
4 Berkshire Chronicle, 16 July 1853. 
5 Ibid . 
6 County Courts Chronicle (herafter CCC) Sept. 1853, p. 120. 
7 M. Stenton, Who 's Who of British Members of Parliament: Volume I, 1832-1885. 
Harvester Press, Hassocks , 1976. p. 36. 
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personal influence of Mr Blackstone and his family' remained considerable. 8 
We see in this verdict a clear favouring of the word of a person of standing 
above that of a labourer. This is perhaps not surprising; similar social biases in the 
evaluation of witnesses and the assessment of evidence were a powerful force in the 
shaping of the Victorian criminal justice system 9 What is more revealing here is the 
nature of the sentence passed and the way it was enforced by this minor civil court. 
Judge Parry awarded damages at the maximum sum of £50, plus full costs , to Miss 
Blackstone, and quite exceptionally ordered immediate execution of this award. 
Turner could not pay, and so his personal possessions were seized by the court bailiff; 
at sale they realised just £3 3s. Turner was then ordered by the court to payoff his 
debt at the rate of 6s . per month, which, in the words of the County Courts Chronicle , 
had the effect of 'alienating a considerable proportion of his weekJy earnings for 
seventeen years prospectively, and subjecting him, in default of payment, to repeated 
monthly imprisonments during the whole of his future life'. 10 Turner defaulted on 
the first instalment, and in November he again appeared before Judge Parry , now 
owing £63 12s. 9d., a result of additional court charges. 
In the previous month Turner had earned an average of 14s. 8d. per week, on 
which he attempted to maintain his wife and five dependent children aged between 18 
months and 15 years . He had spent his savings of over £6 on legal expenses , and 
since the seizure and sale of his personal property the family had no possessions other 
than clothing and basic household goods. Nevertheless Judge Parry concluded that 
Turner had had the means to pay his instalment, and had wilfully refused to do so. 
Turner was sent to Abingdon Gaol for 30 days for deliberate non-payment of a debt; 
his wife and family sought relief in the local workhouse. When William Church, 'a 
8 C. R. Dod ' Electoral Facts from 1832 to 1853. Whittaker and Co. , London, 1853. 
p. 323. 
9 Carolyn A. Conley, The Unwritten Law: Criminal Justice in Victorian Kent. Oxford 
University Press , New York, 1991. 
10 cec, January 1854, p.4 . 
3 
respectable tradesman of the town' rose in court with an offer to pay the instalment 
on behalf of Turner, he was 'ordered by the judge to sit down and remain silent. '11 
The evident vindictiveness of Judge Parry's decision inspired the ' leading 
inhabitants and tradesmen' of Wallingford to send a deputation of protest, led by the 
mayor, to the Home Secretary, Lord PaImerston. They argued that, regardless of the 
merits of the verdict in the case of Blackstone vs. Turner, the sentence was unjust in 
principle: 
People of England with all their boasted privileges , could never live in a state 
of security if upon any trivial breach of the law, they might be subjected to 
fmes amounting to more than the whole of their property, or, in default of 
payment, to imprisonment during the whole of their lives. 12 
Palmerston was reported to have taken a pri11Ul facie view that the case was one of 
great 'hardship and cruelty', 13 but as the County Courts Chronicle noted, this was ' a 
wrong without a remedy. '14 The judge had acted strictly within the law, there was 
no right of appeal from the County Court to a higher court, the Secretary of State had 
no power to interfere with the orders of a judge, and the Royal prerogative did not 
extend to custody under civil process . Thomas Turner had received a sentence of 
virtual life imprisonment from a civil court because of non-payment of a debt incurred 
through an alleged minor verbal abuse of a middle class woman. 
The case of Thomas Turner was exceptional in its detail , but the imprisonment 
of small debtors by County Court judges was common, both before and after the 1869 
Act 'for the Abolition of Imprisonment for Debt' . 15 Yet large-scale debtors , those 
who had the fmancial status and presence of mind to petition for bankruptcy, could 
11 Berkshire Chronicle, 19 November 1853. 
12 Berkshire Chronicle , 17 Dec. 1853. 
13 Ibid . 
14 CCC, January 1854, p.4. 
15 32 & 33 Vict. , c.62. 
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avoid the double jeopardy faced by Turner of a creditor imposing a substantial claim 
on his future income, and threatening imprisonment in the case of non-payment. 
Bankruptcy was intended to facilitate a rational distribution of assets to creditors , not 
saddle the debtor with long-term liabilities. By the 1870s the nature and extent of this 
legal discrimination was widely recognised. It was not just the radical political 
economist Leoni Levi who was noting the ' incongruity, if not injustice' in this 
systeml6; a leading article in The Times concluded that ' the law is really unfair and 
unequal . Under an appearance of justice to all classes, it presses hardly on some'.17 
The differential treaunent of what, almost oxymoronically, might be called 
'rich' and 'poor' debtors, appears to be at odds with both contemporary and modern 
interpretations of the rise of contract law in Victorian England. In his Treatise on the 
Law of Contracts, the legal theorist Charles Addison argued in 1847 that ' the law of 
contracts may justly indeed be said to be a universal law adapted to all times and 
races, and all places and circumstances, being founded upon those great and 
fundamental principles of right and wrong deduced from natural reason which are 
immutable and eternal ' . 18 More recently , Patrick Atiyah has suggested that ' the 
period 1770-1870 saw the emergence of general principles of contract law closely 
associated with the development of the free market and the ideals of the political 
economists' .1 9 
While general principles may characterise some elements of contract law in 
Victorian England, they do not seem to apply to the legal relationship between 
creditors and debtors . Despite three official enquiries into the working of the County 
16 L. Levi , 'On the Abolition of Imprisonment for Debt ', Law Magazine and Review, 
3 (1847) , p. 598. 
17 Times , 27 December 1879, reprinted in County and Borough Prisons: Correspondence 
in the Times ', Howard Association , London, 1880, p.6. 
18 Cited in P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract . Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1979. p. 400. 
19 Atiyah , Rise and Fall, p. 398. 
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Courts and the imprisonment of small debtors between 1873 and 190920 , there was 
no move towards universalism in the law regulating the recovery of debts in the 
Victorian and Edwardian period. As well as suffering their poverty, the poor had to 
suffer an overtly prejudicial class bias in the one area of contract law that had direct 
and repeated bearing upon their lives . 
In this paper I want to consider why small debtors received disproportionately 
harsh treatment as compared with bankrupts - in other words, why legal theory and 
legal practice were so consistently and enduringly at odds with each other. I will 
examine, in turn, four possible explanations for this discriminatory treatment: 
differences in the legislative basis of the separate debt recovery systems relating to 
bankruptcy and small debts , differences in their practical procedures, differences in 
the economic circumstances of the debtors , and differences in their social status. 
However, in order to provide some context for this discussion I will fIrst present a 
brief outline of the development of the law relating to small debts and bankruptcy in 
Victorian England. 
In 1846 a comprehensive system of County Courts was established to supersede 
the idiosyncratic network of Courts of Requests through which civil actions for low 
value had hitherto been conducted.2 1 The County Courts had jurisdiction where the 
debt, damage, or demand claimed did not exceed £20, a limit raised to £50 in 1850 
and to £100 in 1905 .22 This defmition of 'small' was relative. In the 18505 few 
manual workers, even skilled artisans , could have earned more than £1 per week, a 
20 Select Committee on Imprisonment for Debt, pp 1873 XV ; House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Debtors Act pp 1893-4 (HL) IX; Select Committee on Debtors 
(Imprisonment) pp 1909 VII . 
21 H.W. Arthurs , ' "Without the Law": Courts of Local and Special Jurisdiction in 
Nineteenth Century England '. Journal of Legal History 5 (1984), 130-49. 
22 Sir Thomas Snagge, The Evolution of the County Coun. William Clowes , London, 
1904. p.14 . 
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figure that may have doubled by the turn of the century,23 so debts equal to a year' s 
wage income could be pursued through these courts. In practice the sums owing were 
generally much less. Throughout the period 1847-1914 over 98% of cases were for 
sums of less than £20, with an average amount owing of around £3,24 and many 
claims were for less than the equivalent of a week's wages . Court records from both 
London and an industrial area of north-east England for 1910-11 show that half of all 
small debt cases were for sums owing of less than £1 , and a quarter were for less than 
10 shillingS .25 
The County Court system was an immediate success, at least in terms of the 
amount of business conducted. In the flISt quinquennium the yearly average of causes 
was 433,000, and by 1904 over lA million plaints for recovery of debt were initiated 
in these courts . This may, in part, have reflected the accessibility of the courts. 
Despite their name, the County Courts were not organised by administrative county, 
but instead the country was mapped out into 60 circuits encompassing over 500 court 
towns , chosen according to the Registrar General of Population' s enumeration 
districts 26 Court towns within each circuit had an average range of jurisdiction of 
seven miles, which was considered a reasonable distance for a plaintiff or defendant 
to walk in order to attend a hearing. 21 Accessibility to the due process of law was 
23 C.H. Feinstein, 1990, ' New estimates of average earnings in the United Kingdom , 
1880-1913', Economic History Review 43: 595-632. 
24 Aggregate statistics of court business are derived from the returns of the county 
courts, published annually in the Judicial Statistics volume of the Parliamentary Papers. See 
also H. Smith , 'The Resurgent County Court in Victorian Britain ' , American Journal of 
Legal History 13 (1969) , pp. 126-38, at p.128. 
25 West Hartlepool County Court plaint book , 1910; Public Record Office AK 19/9 
(these records have now been transferred to the Cleveland County Archives) ; Wandsworth 
County Court, ordinary summons book B (1911); Greater London Record Office AK2111 
26 Snagge, Evolution, p. 13. There were 59 new County Court circuits , plus the existing 
City of London court. 
21 J.E.D. Bethune , Report to the Lord Chancellor on the formation of County Court 
Districts , 19 Dec. 1846. Public Record Office, Kew, LCO 811 137401. 
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a necessary requirement of a more general and commercial system of contract law, 
and in this sense at least, County Courts fit with the rationalising process noted by 
Atiyah. 
However, a logical organisational structure does not guarantee the application 
of 'universal law', and in the case of recovery of debts in nineteenth-century England 
universality was undermined by the evolution of a quite separate but parallel legal 
system for the administration of bankruptcy. Although the substantive law of 
bankruptcy was in place in England by 1800, the nineteenth century saw successive 
attempts to improve the efficiency of bankruptcy administration.28 Important 
legislative changes in 1831 and 1883 expanded the role of government in the 
management of bankrupt estates, although in the 1860s there was a short-lived reaction 
against 'officialism' and a return to creditor-managed administration. However, the 
basic principles of bankruptcy endured throughout the century. Traders, and from 
1861 non-traders who owed substantial debts, could ftle a petition in bankruptcy. 
Debtors had to be fairly wealthy to go bankrupt, since a £10 fee was levied on 
bankruptcy petitions , but this could be a sound investment. Bankruptcy status 
protected the assets of the debtor from summary seizure by creditors, and safeguarded 
any future earnings from claims arising from previously acquired debts and liabilities . 
The annual business of the bankruptcy courts was , relative to the County 
Courts, minuscule in terms of number of cases, but significant in terms of sums 
owing. Up to 1860 there were between I , 100 and 2,000 cases annually, with losses 
averaging £4 million to £5 million a year. After the 1883 Bankruptcy Act, there were 
around 4,000 bankruptcies a year, with losses averaging £5 million - a not dissimilar 
figure to the more than £4 million of debts annually being pursued through the County 
Courts in the Edwardian period. It should be noted that formal bankruptcy was not 
the only way of shedding debts ; private arrangements between creditors and debtors 
appear to have been more numerous than formal bankruptcy proceedings at least until 
28 The nineteenth century reforms of bankruptcy law are covered in detail in V. 
Markham Lester, Victorian Insolvency . Oxford University Press, Oxford , 1995 . 
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the 1880s, and the growth in the number of limited liability companies meant that by 
the end of the century company winding-up accounted for annual losses in the order 
of £20 million29 . 
However, it was not differences between County and bankruptcy courts in the 
average size of debt or number of cases heard which produced the accusations of 
unfairness, injustice, and class bias in the treatment of debtors. What concerned the 
critics was the relative viciousness of the County Courts in exacting full payment from 
small debtors , and in imposing penal sentences on those who could not or would not 
pay. In the small debt courts, when a case was found for the plaintiff (and the 
chances of a case being found for the defendant were never better than I :50, and 
usually nearer 1: 100)30, the debtor was required to pay 100 per cent of the sum 
owing. Since, almost by defmition, small debtors had few assets, the requirement to 
payoff the debt in full was effectively a lien on future earnings. This contrasted with 
bankruptcy proceedings where the object was to distribute the bankrupt's remaining 
assets proportionately among the creditors on some pro-rata basis which seldom 
exceeded a payment of 10s. per £ of debt, and to prevent creditors exercising a claim 
on the future earnings of the bankrupt. In the case of small debtors , past errors were 
to be redeemed by future virtue, while for bankrupts , past errors were to be written 
off. 
The degree of financial discrimination against small debtors was striking, but 
it was not the primary justification for describing the legal system of debt recovery as 
'class law' . 31 This epithet was used particularly to characterise the quite iniquitous 
system of imprisoning small debtors who failed to redeem their debt by paying-up the 
sums due, and at the times specified by the court. Arrest on mesne process was 
29 Lester , Insolvency, pp . 240-6 ; 306- 13. 
30 Johnson , ' Small Debts ', p. 67. 
; 1 Paul Johnson, 'Class Law in Victorian England ', Past arui Present 141 , (1993) , pp. 
147-69; G.R. Rubin , 'Law, Poverty and Imprisonment for Debt, 1869-1914, in G.R. Rubin 
and David Sugarman (eds.) , Law, Economy arui Society, 1750-1914. Abingdon, 1984. pp. 
241-99, at pp. 275-6. 
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abolished in 1838, and the Debtors Act of 1869, entitled 'An Act for the Abolition of 
Imprisonment for Debt' appeared to abolish arrest and imprisonment on fmal 
process ,32 but in practice, as Gerry Rubin has demonstrated in his pioneering analysis 
of this Act, several thousand people each year continued to be incarcerated for non-
payment of small debts . 
As well as being discriminatory, this retention of the power of conunittal over 
small debtors seems to run counter to the more general, rational and market-oriented 
development of contract law in the Victorian period described by Atiyah. If the 
purpose of a legal system for the recovery of debt is to maximise the payments to 
creditors , it seems perverse to apply the sanction of imprisonment on the debtor, since 
this will almost of necessity prevent him acquiring or earning the means to pay . 
Imprisonment for debt signified the continuation of a pre-modem punitive sanction 
against the body of the debtor for his economic transgression . Bankruptcy 
proceedings , on the other hand, sought a rational distribution of economic loss among 
the creditors, on the principle they had all openly entered into contracts with the 
defaulting party , and had to accept the downside of market fluctuations and business 
failure . 
II 
Describing the difference in treatment of bankrupts and small debtors is easy; 
explaining it is more tricky, especially when we know that the prejudice the law 
expressed towards small debtors was widely recognised by contemporaries . Was the 
utilitarian pursuit of general legal principles , rational administration and equal 
treatment nothing more than a rhetorical smoke screen to disguise blatant class 
prejudice, or should we look for a more complex and more subtle historical 
explanation? I believe that in most respects both the reforms to, and the operation of, 
32 Arrest on final process had been abolished for debts of less than £20 in 1844, but in 
1845 this liberalising measure was reversed by a new Act which designated as fraudulent any 
debt contracted by an individual lacking any reasonable prospect of being able to pay; a 
condition which applied to most working-class debtors most of the time. Fraudulent debtors 
were not exempted from arrest on final process by the 1844 Act. See Rubin , ' Law', pp. 244-
9. 
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the laws of bankruptcy and indebtedness were rational and equitable; that the outcomes 
should have been so diverse is a consequence of contemporary presumptions about 
economic psychology and moral worth. In order to make this case I will look in turn 
at the legislative basis and the practical procedures of the small debt and bankruptcy 
systems, at the economic circumstances of the debtors, and at their social status. 
Legislation 
The legislative intention of the 1846 Act which established the County Courts 
was clear - to improve the efficiency of debt collection. Pursuit of debtors through 
the existing Courts of Request involved a number of hindrances which became 
increasingly burdensome as the scale and range of commercial activity expanded in 
the era of the penny post and the railway . The commissioners or judges who decided 
on cases in these courts were laymen (by the 1830s they had to be substantial property 
owners) with limited legal knowledge, and limited time to devote to hearings . More 
important, perhaps, the jurisdiction of the Courts of Request was geographically 
limited and judgements could not be enforced against defendants whose goods or 
persons lay beyond the court borders. 
What the County Courts provided, from 1847, was a comprehensive and 
standardised network of small claim courts , with common competences and rules of 
procedure. There was an official code of rules, common forms and scale of costs , 
judges were trained lawyers with seven years' standing at the Bar (later raised to 10 
years), and they were assisted by Registrars who required five years' standing as 
solicitors. 33 This professionalisation of small debt recovery procedure was not 
restricted to the judiciary; lawyers also enhanced their status by obtaining a near 
monopoly of the right to represent litigants , to the exclusion of unqualified ' Iow 
attorneys'. The 1846 Act gave courts the power to refuse to hear any but the parties 
to a suit or their attorney or counsel. In practice this work was conducted by 
solicitors rather than barristers; there was no acknowledged County Court Bar, even 
33 Snagge, Evolution , p. 12. 
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in the largest towns .34 There remained, however, some ambiguity about exactly who 
could speak on behalf of whom in court. ' Narrow application of the restrictive 
conditions of the 1846 Ads gave way to a recognition that working men might often 
be unable to attend a hearing and so should be allowed to be represented by a wife or 
other family member or even a ' friendly neighbour' . Likewise employers could be 
represented by someone in their employment, for instance a book-keeper, but judges 
attempted, not always successfully, to draw the line at 'the class of accountants and 
debt-collectors ' because ' their function is not to represent absent parties ' .36 
H.W. Arthurs has written rather negatively of the way in which the 1846 
legislation saw the fInal demise of local and communal justice and the rise of 
formalism and professionalism31, but in terms of rational administration on general 
principles , the County Courts represented a positive step along the progressive path 
outlined by Atiyah. Greater legal formalism was a way of reducing the discretion of 
the courts and, as far as parties to any contract were concerned, of increasing the 
certainty of outcome. In economic terms , this contributed to an overall reduction in 
transaction costs , a factor identifIed by institutional economists as a key element in the 
development of the industrial economies in the 19th century. 38 
Victorian legislation on bankruptcy was similarly intended to improve efficiency 
34 Snagge, Evolution, pp. 23-4; David Sugarman, 'Simple images and complex realities: 
English lawyers and their relationship to business and politics, 1750-1950', Law and History 
Review 11(2), Fall 1993,257-301. See particularly p.295 . 
35 CCC (4) , September 1847, p.79. 
36 Comments of Judge Snagge in Halifax County Court, on the question of unqualified 
practitioners . CCC (3 1) April , 1888, p. 368. The fact that this opinion needed to be 
reiterated more than forty years after the establishment of the county courts indicates that the 
boundaries of professional competence between lawyers and other professionals or quasi-
professionals remained contested throughout the Victorian period. See D. Sugarman, 'Qui 
colonise I'autre? Reflexions historiques sur les rapports entre le droit, les juristes et les 
comptables en Grand-Bretagne' Droit et Societe , 7 (1993), pp. 169-82. 
31 Arthurs, 'Without the Law' , pp. 143-4. 
38 Douglass C. North , Institutions, institutional change and economic peiformance 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990. 
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and reduce costs ; this has been analysed recently by Markham Lester. He sees this 
history as fitting very defmitely into· Atiyah' s model of reform induced by classical 
economic ideals , even though the creation of the posts of official assignee by the 1831 
Bankruptcy Act, and official receiver under the 1883 Act, do not conform to an 
absolutist interpretation of laissez-faire government. 39 The primary intention of these 
reforms was to promote a more efficient administration of bankrupt estates , and to 
maximise the dividends paid to creditors . Some legal regulation was required to 
ensure the rational distribution of assets among a multiplicity of competing claims 
from creditors, and to prevent bankrupts spiriting away any assets in their possession 
before administration of their estate could begin. There were substantial differences 
of opinion, within both the commercial and legal communities, about how these goals 
could best be achieved, but little disagreement about the goals themselves. 
Procedure 
Legislative intent may not be translated into effective action. How rational, 
general, open and efficient was the system of debt recovery in practice? Bankruptcy 
administration faced a particular procedural problem in the case of small estates - it 
was not worth the while of any individual creditor to expend time and effort 
administering the bankrupt's estate for a small share of the dividend, and collective 
supervision of private assignees was also often more trouble than it was worth. The 
result was erratic, sometimes irresponsible, and sometimes corrupt administration of 
bankrupt estates , yet consistent bankruptcy administration was a necessary feature of 
an efficient commercial society . Private interest was not sufficiently motivated to 
ensure the public good, and it was this failure of both individual and collective action 
in the case of small estates that motivated Lord Brougham to propose that an official 
assignee be appointed by the court to administer the bankrupt estate, and to draw 
appropriate compensation from the estate. This element of official ism was a key 
component of the 1831 Bankruptcy Act. 
39 Lester , insolvency, pp . 301-2. 
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The introduction of official administration may have promoted the public good 
by imposing a more standardised and rational procedure for the distribution of assets 
to creditors, but the creditors themselves were far from convinced of the merits of the 
system. Lester has shown that the business community , although far from unanimous 
in its attitudes towards bankruptcy reform, was vociferous in its opposition to official 
administration. The principal complaint related to cost; the expenses of administration 
on average consumed one third of the assets available for distribution in a bankrupt's 
estate .40 Yet a return to creditor-managed bankruptcy in 1869 did nothing to reduce 
costs, and the 1883 Act which re-imposed administration by official receivers for 
bankruptcies with assets under £300 failed to bring administration costs below 40 % 
of gross receipts in these smaller cases .4 1 
The small debt courts, by comparison, were models of efficiency. The average 
debt was around £3 , the cost of entering a plaint and issuing a summons for a claim 
of this sum was 4 shillings, followed by a further charge of 1 shilling for taking the 
admission if the case was admitted, or 6s. 9d. for a hearing . For a straightforward 
case of average value, therefore, costs represented around 8 % of the sum owing if 
settlement was achieved before a court hearing, and 18 % if the case came to court. 
Even if a case was pursued through to the issue and execution of a warrant of 
commitment, the additional fees amounted to only Is . 2d. per £ of debt, or a total cost 
of under 24 % of the average debt. 42 
Not only was the small debt recovery procedure cheap, it was also quick. The 
first stage was for the creditor to enter a plaint for recovery of the debt with the 
registrar of the court. This plaint gave the name and address of the alleged creditor 
and debtor and the nature and size of the alleged debt. A summons stating the 
40 Ibid , p. 133. 
41 Ibid , p.295. 
42 Scale of Court Fees. CCC March 1855. See also Select Committee on Imprisonment 
for Debt, P.P. 1873 XV, q. 197 (Evidence of Mr Henry Nicol , superintendent of County 
Courts in the Treasury) . 
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substance of the action was then served on the defendant, giving the date of a court 
hearing , which was usually within four weeks of a plaint being entered. If the case 
came to court and a judgement was issued , it was up to the plaintiff to secure the 
compliance of the debtor. If the debtor could not or would not pay, the creditor could 
apply for a judgement summons to be issued, which obliged the debtor to attend court 
to explain why he had not paid as directed. If a defendant failed to attend a judgement 
summons hearing without notification of good cause, then a warrant for execution 
against goods owned, or for commitment to prison for up to 6 weeks, was issued 
against him. Few cases went this far; on average only 60 % of cases came to court, 
judgement summonses were issued in about 20 % of cases , warrants of commitment 
issued in about 7 %, and imprisonment enforced in less than 0 .5 % of cases. 
Universal accessibility to a uniform system of law had been one of the 
objectives in the establishment of the county courts, and simplicity of procedure was 
held to be an important element of accessibility . Particulars of claims were entered 
in straight forward language in the plaint book, parties were able to be witnesses in 
their own case, and judges were empowered to admit hearsay evidence about, for 
instance, a defendant's ability to pay. Compared with the complexity of bankruptcy 
administration, this was almost a model of plain man's law, although which plain man 
benefited could depend on the outlook of the particular judge or registrar. In 1905 the 
President of the County Court Registrars ' Association prompted a fervent exchange 
of opinion in the trade journal , the County Courts Chronicle, by stating in his 
presidential address that: 
In the smaller class of cases, as they knew, they did not insist on the rules of 
evidence. No registrar who knew his business thought of insisting on the rules 
of evidence. He asked for the tradesman' s books the very first thing, and , if 
the entries were properly made up and in order of date, that was taken as prima 
facie evidence in many cases to which, very rightly, a great deal of importance 
was attached.43 
43 eee July 1905 , p. 175 . See also correspondence in eec, August 1905 , p. 203. 
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Yet this flexibility could equally work in the interests of the debtor. Courts had no 
resources to investigate the means of each defendant, and in determining the size and 
frequency of repayment instalments they typically took the unsubstantiated word of the 
defendant or his representative about how much could be afforded each week or 
month. 
In the early days of the County Courts some judges took infonnality and 
accessibility too far , at least in the eyes of the County Couns Chronicle. At Brentford 
County Court in 1847, not only did the court sit in the back room of a public house, 
with large numbers of ' intoxicated and noisy' defendants present, but the judge, clerk 
and high bailiff all sat at 'at a common lodging table, none of them being distinguished 
by any badge of office'.44 The Chronicle remarked that Judges should always appear 
in wig and gown, and clerks in robes , because 'it is a fonn in the administration of 
justice to which the public mind has become so familiarised that it will not associate 
the idea of equal dignity and importance to a Court that shows them not. ' 45 
Concern about the public ' face ' of justice, as represented by the theatre of court 
proceedings, recurred throughout the years up to 1914. In 1905 it was reported that 
Judge Edge had refused audience to an unrobed solicitor in his court, even though 
robing was a recommendation, not a requirement, of the Law Society; in an echo of 
the discussion almost sixty years earlier, it was suggested in the County Couns 
Chronicle that robing should be enforced ' to maintain the dignity of the legal 
profession' .46 But the stage set was as important as the costumes. After an 
extension of the jurisdiction of the County Courts in 1903 the editor of the Chronicle 
lamented the 'disgraceful accommodation at the metropolitan County Courts ', and 
argued that their physical facilities should be enhanced to match their increased 
importance. As in Brentford in 1847, part of the concern was that the propriety of 
legal proceedings was being compromised by an association with common drinking 
44 eec, Sept. 1847, p. 77. 
45 eec, October 1847, p. ? 
46 cee May 1905 , p. 123 . 
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dens. In Westminster County Court, of all places, it was claimed that: 
The registrars ' court is about as large as a railway carriage, and situate in a 
sort of passage; the robing-room is about the same size, and has no adequate 
accommodation at all. There are no waiting rooms or proper lavatories for 
suitors . Consultations must be held in the public street or the public house. 
In the court, counsel, solicitors, witnesses and judge are all huddled together 
in a miniature Black hole of Calcutta.47 
But if the external status of the courts continued to be a cause for concern, their rising 
professional status was a matter for some self-congratulatory puffery; fifty years on 
from the foundation of the County Courts, the Chronicle could boast that of the 29 
judges appointed in the previous 6 years , 13 were QCS. 48 
There was no obvious sign of this growing legal formalism crowding out the 
layman's direct access to the due process of law. Whilst many traders used solicitors 
to represent them in court, in a minority of cases working-class plaintiffs appeared in 
person to pursue their claims for payment by lodgers or for repayment of small loans. 49 
It is unclear how far this use of the County Courts by working-class plaintiffs 
indicates a general acceptability of the institution and the process of debt recovery. 
The enormous number of cases annually processed by these courts must mean that the 
experience of being 'County Courted' was common among manual workers, even 
though defendants failed to attend initial hearings in around half of all cases that came 
to court. For those who did attend a hearing (or, as was frequently the case, whose 
wife attended the hearing) , the experience of court procedure must have been 
breathtaking; records of the West Hartlepool court show that cases were heard and 
judgements dispensed at the rate of one every 85 seconds. 50 
If we compare bankruptcy and small debt procedure in terms of cost, speed, 
47 eee January 1905 , pp. 3-4. 
48 eec, April 1897, p. 87. 
49 Johnson , 'Class Law', p.166, note 61. 
50 Johnson , 'Small debts ', p. 70. 
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and accessibility , then it is small debt recovery in the County Courts that most closely 
reflects a universal law responding to the novel needs of a commercial society. 51 
It seems unlikely, therefore, that the widely perceived discriminatory nature of small 
debt enforcement can be attributed either to differences in the legislative basis or the 
procedural norms of the bankruptcy and small debt courts. Perhaps , then, the 
explanation lies in substantive differences in the economic circumstances of bankrupts 
and small debtors . 
Economic Circumstances 
The majority of defendants in the small debt courts were male manual workers -
in the small number of plaint books I have found in which occupation is recorded, 
over 90 % of defendants fall into this category, with around 5 % being dealers or 
traders of some sort. The plaintiffs were overwhelmingly local traders , with drapers 
usually heading the list, but with general dealers and grocers following closely 
behind. 52 In the bankruptcy courts , on the other hand, grocers, publicans , builders 
and farmers constituted the largest categories of debtors, followed by bootrnakers , 
tailors, drapers, butchers and bankers.53 In the main, therefore, bankrupts were 
shopkeepers and dealers who owed other traders , small debtors were working men 
who owed shopkeepers and dealers. 
But this clear distinction by occupation becomes fuzzy when we attempt to 
distinguish by reference to the fmancial value of the debts . By the late Victorian and 
Edwardian period, between 30 and 40 % of bankruptcy estates had a gross asset value 
of under £25 , with an average value of around £12. By comparison, in 1911 the 
average per capita value of working class fmancial assets held across a broad array of 
51 Atiyah , Rise and Fall, pp. 518-9. 
52 Johnson, 'Small Debts ', p. 68 . 
53 Lester, Insolvency, pp . 314-5. 
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saving and insurance institutions was around £1154, and a contemporary estimate put 
the average value at death of working class estates in the period 1899-1904 at £16s5 
Around one third of bankrupts, therefore, were indistinguishable from the majority of 
adult male manual workers in terms of the value of their accumulated fmancial and 
non-fmancial assets . 
If we examine the fmancial threshold of claims allowable in the County Courts 
we also fmd no clear distinction between small debts and bankruptcy. In 1910, 70 % 
of bankrupt estates yielded gross assets of less than £100, which was the maximum 
threshold for action in the County Courts. Of course the stated liabilities of bankrupts 
typically would have been over £100, but so too could be the liabilities of small 
debtors . Whereas in bankruptcy the claims of all creditors were pooled, in the County 
Courts individual creditors pursued their claims independently , so a multiple debtor 
could face several simultaneous claims for recovery of debts each up to the value of 
£100. Although the legislation relating to recovery of debts appeared to establish a 
crisp distinction of scale between bankruptcy and small debt proceedings , in fact this 
was illusory. 
Social status 
What really distinguished the defendants in bankruptcy and small debt 
proceedings was their social status , and this mattered because of assumptions made by 
judges about the economic motivations of people of different social class. The 
majority of County Court judges presented a consistent view, in both their judgements 
and their responses to official inquiries , that many working men defaulted on their 
debts quite deliberately , that this was an oppressive burden on honest traders , and that 
the power of imprisonment must be retained in order to extract due payment. A few 
examples must suffice. 
Sol Paul Johnson, Saving ami Spemiing: The Working-Class Economy in Britain 187()" 
1939. Oxford University Press , Oxford , 1985. p.205 . 
ss L.O. Chiozza Money , Riches ami Poverty (London, 3rd edn. , 1906), p. 51. 
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In an open letter to Lord Palmerston, Home Secretary, in 1854, Judge Johnes 
of the Caernarvon County Court could not have been more explicit in his beliefs about 
the rights and wrongs of plaintiffs and defendants : 
Take a common case - a young man, without family, earning high wages as a 
miner or mechanic, contracts a debt of a few pounds with a small tradesman, 
who sues him and obtains judgement. To take out execution against the goods 
is futile because, though in one sense wealthy, the defendant probably has none 
worth levying on. His high wages are possibly squandered in taverns or 
secreted in such a way that they cannot be reached by the creditor. .. The 
defendants who thus evade and defy their creditors, are commonly men who 
are, in a pecuniary sense, much better off than the great majority of the 
professional men of this country - the wages they receive being commonly 
higher than the average remuneration of professional men, especially when we 
take into account the less refmed mode in which they live . .. On the other hand , 
the creditors , whose confidence they abuse, generally belong to the poorest and 
most necessitous class of small retail dealers , a class who have no superfluous 
funds to spend in dubious litigation with knaves, and to whom legal redress , 
unless it be really cheap and accessible, is a mockery .56 
Here we see, combined in one short comment, moral judgements about the 
fecklessness of manual workers and the integrity of small traders , together with a 
gross misrepresentation of the economic circumstances of working class life . 
Although Judge Johnes was more forthright and open in his opinions than many 
County Court judges57, his views about the calculated dishonesty of working-class 
debtors were widely shared by his fellow judges . Judge Snagge, in Witney Court in 
1897, remarked that: 'A judgment summons is the only way in which a levy can be 
made effectually upon the pockets of the labouring man who has obtained credit and 
wishes to button up his pocket and does not wish to pay ... . They often say they will 
5. CCC July 1854, p. 164. 
57 Judge Johnes was a frequent correspondent to the County Couns Chronicle. 
20 
not pay, but do so cheerfully when they hear the clang of the prison door behind 
them'5S This sentiment was echoed by Judge Cadman at Dewsbury : 'There was 
undoubtedly a detennination on the part of persons not to pay until the very last 
moment. Debtors in the past had been given every consideration, and tradesmen and 
other plaintiffs who had to pay for the goods they sued for in court were worthy of 
equal consideration' .59 The fact that 99.5% of defendants paid up before the prison 
door closed behind them was taken to imply that the initial non-payment was, in many 
cases, wilful. It was also asserted that many of the initial purchases, particularly from 
itinerant traders or tallymen, were unnecessary fripperies, so the debtor was doubly 
unworthy . 
Not all judges were as questioning of working-class intentions as Snagge and 
Cadman; there was always a diversity of opinions among the County Court judiciary 
and more widely within the legal profession . The Law Times was adamant that 
fraudulent debtors constituted 'an insignificant minority' of cases coming to the 
County Courts . The majority of debtors were 'poor persons to whom credit is often 
recklessly given, who benefit little by it, to whom debt is a calamity , whose "means" 
are so shadowy that evidence of them is most difficult to present in any satisfactory 
shape to a judicial tribunal .'60 According to the progressive Judge E.A. Parry , 
between 1869 and 1914 the County Courts had sent to prison over 300,000 people 
who were not guilty of any crime; ' they have been imprisoned mainly for poverty or, 
if you will , for improvidence. '61 Nevertheless , the majority view of the judiciary 
presented to three separate Select Committees between 1873 and 1909 was that the 
ultimate sanction of imprisonment must be retained in order to force working men to 
honour contracts they had openly entered into with traders. 
In bankruptcy proceedings , on the other hand, the legal system endorsed the 
58 eee June 1897, p. 155 . 
59 eee February 1897, p. 35. 
60 Law Times, quoted in eec, March 1893, p.60. 
61 E.A. Parry, The Law and the Poor London , Smith , Elder & Co. , 1914. p.57 . 
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view of traders and businessmen that unpaid debts were an unfortunate consequence 
of the inevitable uncertainties of the commercial world. In the eyes of small 
businessmen, bankruptcy statistics were: 
the saddest official figures published, for the statistics relating to Poor Law 
administration must of necessity relate to a very large number of people who 
have never made a legitimate attempt to keep themselves from want, and are 
not deserving of consideration, while the bankruptcy figures must include 
amongst the failures a large proportion of men and women who may have 
missed success by the merest chance, but who have honestly attempted to carve 
out a career for themselves .62 
This was, of course, a specious argument when applied to the working-class debtors 
dragged through the county courts. In an age before extensive sickness and 
unemployment insurance, when most manual workers were hired and paid by the day 
or the week, it was almost certainly workers rather than traders who had least control 
of their economic circumstances, and who had least economic opportunity to be 
extravagant. Moreover, as the Law Times remarked, the treatment of small debtors 
was unequal in law, regardless of the underlying economic, social and moral 
circumstances : 'If the theory of imprisoning for nonpayment of money which a court 
orders to be paid is the right one, there ought to be no distinction . Every money 
judgment in every court should be enforceable by commitment. ,63 
III 
Let me try to draw some brief conclusions . I set out to consider why small debtors 
received disproportionately harsh treatment as compared with bankrupts, and why the 
concept of a more general, commercial and rational law of contract seemed not to 
emerge in the practice of debt recovery. What I have attempted to show is that in 
structure and procedure, both small debt recovery and bankruptcy administration did 
62 Trade Protection Journal , October 1907, p. 170. See also Lester, Victorian 
Insolvency, p. 136. 
63 Law Times , quoted in eec, March 1893, p. 60. 
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become more rational in the nineteenth century; this was particularly so in the 
recovery of small debts, where costs were low and action swift. But rational reform 
of both the small debt and bankruptcy systems did not produce similar outcomes. 
In theory the different frnancial circumstances of bankrupts and small debtors 
might explain the divergence in outcomes. In practice, however, the frnancial 
circumstances of most bankrupts were not significantly different from those of many 
manual workers, so different outcomes cannot easily be explained by reference to 
objective economic criteria . What allowed lower middle class bankrupts to shed a 
large proportion of their debts was a legal presumption that they were worthy but 
unlucky traders who wished honestly to repay, to the best of their ability, debts often 
unwittingly incurred because of fluctuations in trading conditions. What led to the 
harsh and discriminatory treatment of small debtors was a judicial assumption that 
some significant proportion of them ended up in court because of a fundamental lack 
of desire and intention to honour debts they had willingly entered into. Of course 
these presumptions were seldom investigated; bankruptcy administrators sought to 
distribute assets , not uncover fraudulent intent; and in the county courts the judges, 
dealing with cases in little more than one minute each, had not the time, even if they 
had the inclination, to enquire into the motives and morals of the debtors. Despite the 
driving force of an autonoous legal rationalism in Victorian England, there remained 
considerable social inequality of legal outcomes for bankrupts and small debtors 
because of the deeply-rooted belief among a majority of judges that the working 
classes were morally inferior. 
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